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Policing Immigration 
Adam B. Cox† & Thomas J. Miles†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, local police are being integrated into federal immigration en-
forcement on a scale never seen before in American history. This transfor-
mation of immigration law is not the result of the high-profile efforts by Ari-
zona and a few other states to regulate migrants. Instead, it is the product of 
a largely overlooked federal program known as “Secure Communities.” 
Launched four years ago, the program’s goal is simple: to check the immigra-
tion status of every single person arrested by local police anywhere in the 
country. 
Secure Communities represents the future of immigration enforcement. 
It dramatically lowers the information cost of identifying immigration viola-
tors, accelerates the ongoing convergence of the immigration and criminal 
bureaucracies in the United States, and reshapes the structure of immigration 
federalism. Despite its significance, however, little is known about the pro-
gram. 
This Article, part of a larger project providing the first large-scale empir-
ical evaluation of Secure Communities, uses the program’s rollout to explore 
a pervasive feature of criminal and administrative law that rarely lends itself 
to empirical examination—the role of discretion in policing. The breadth of 
discretion wielded by police and prosecutors is probably the single most im-
portant feature of modern law enforcement. Controlling that discretion—
through judicial intervention, administrative design, and so on—has conse-
quently become the central preoccupation of criminal and administrative law 
scholarship. For all that attention, however, we often have little sense of how 
law enforcement officials actually wield the discretion they possess. Anecdo-
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tal accounts abound, but systemic empirical evidence is rarely available. This 
is even truer with respect to immigration enforcement, which represents one 
of the largest and least studied law enforcement bureaucracies in the United 
States. 
Secure Communities’rollout provides a unique opportunity to study the 
role of discretion in immigration enforcement. While the program is de-
signed to check the immigration status of anyone arrested by local police an-
ywhere in the country, resource limitations forced the federal government to 
stagger the program’s activation across the country. Rather than activating 
the program simultaneously nationwide, Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) rolled out the program on a county-by-county basis. As one 
would expect, senior administrators faced with limited resources made the 
explicit decision to target high-priority counties for early activation. The pat-
tern of activation therefore provides a revealing look into the enforcement 
agency’s priorities, showing us where around the country the government 
chose to concentrate its limited immigration resources. 
Public debate about Secure Communities points to three potential sets 
of priorities that might have driven the geography of roll-out. ICE has said 
repeatedly that Secure Communities is a tool for preventing crime and re-
moving serious “criminal aliens”from the country. That justification suggests 
that counties with the most serious crime problems and the largest number 
of noncitizens engaged in crime would be targeted for early activation. While 
crime is the putative focus, however, Secure Communities also makes en-
forcement cheaper by lowering the information cost of identifying immigra-
tion violators. Critics of the program have argued that this is the program’s 
real aim—to identify cheaply more people in violation of immigration law 
whom the agency can then deport. If true, this priority should lead the agen-
cy to target the program at areas with high levels of immigration violators, 
rather than high levels of criminal offenders. Finally, many have suggested 
that bureaucrats worry as much about the political costs of their choices as 
they do the policy consequences. If this were true for those in charge of Se-
cure Communities, we would expect that they would target activation in local 
communities that support the program while delaying activation in counties 
where the program might produce political backlash. 
We test these three hypotheses about the use of discretion using the 
program’s rollout data and extensive data regarding local crime rates, demog-
raphy, and partisan politics. The analysis leads to three principal conclusions. 
First, the data undermine the government’s claim that Secure Communities is 
principally about making communities more secure from crime. High-crime 
areas were, surprisingly, not a priority in the rollout. It is very difficult to 
square the lack of any meaningful correlation between early activation and 
local crime rates with the government’s putative desire to target immigration 
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enforcement resources in a manner designed to reduce the incidence of seri-
ous crime by noncitizens. 
Second, the data provide little support for the claim that the agency’s 
use of discretion was driven more by local politics than federal policy. Many 
critics of local police involvement in immigration enforcement have argued 
that incorporating local police will result in the tail wagging the dog, with lo-
cal governments determining immigration priorities. Whatever the force of 
this concern in contexts like Arizona v United States,1 where Arizona wanted 
to involve itself in immigration enforcement without federal authorization, it 
does not appear to have much purchase here. There is little evidence that the 
pattern of rollout reflected local attitudes about immigration enforcement ra-
ther than federal priorities. This does not mean that politics were irrelevant: 
as we will see, proximity to the border was a powerful predictor of early acti-
vation, and some readers will likely see this prioritization as a reflection of 
politics rather than strictly policy. Nonetheless, there is little support for our 
first or third hypotheses. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the data reveal that early activation 
in the program correlates strongly with whether a county has a large Hispanic 
population. This finding can be seen as support for the hypothesis that the 
rollout prioritized locations thought to have high levels of immigration viola-
tors, given both the demographics and politics of unauthorized migration. It 
is crucial to note, however, that the pattern of correlation between rollout 
and a community’s Hispanic population persists even when we control for 
myriad other factors that might also be thought to be proxies for suspected 
immigration violators, such as a county’s proximity to the border or its 
noncitizen or foreign-born population. Moreover, other demographic proxies 
for immigration violators, such as the local noncitizen or foreign-born popu-
lation, predict the rollout sequence much less well than Hispanic population. 
These findings raise important questions about racial profiling in immigration 
enforcement. While the data should not be interpreted as evidence that the 
government intentionally singled out predominantly Hispanic communities 
for increased immigration enforcement, ICE’s discretionary allocation of re-
sources had the effect of concentrating enforcement in these communities. 
As the exercise of discretion in immigration enforcement becomes more 
centralized within the immigration bureaucracy, patterns like the ones we 
find raise questions identical to those at the heart of debates in criminal jus-
tice today. In the arena of criminal justice, risk-based models of crime pre-
vention have led to strategies like the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program—a 
program that has renewed the focus in criminal law scholarship on questions 
about which communities bear the brunt of the costs of crime prevention 

 1 132 S Ct 2492 (2012). 
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strategies. Our findings about the pattern of Secure Communities’ rollout 
suggests the need to start a parallel conversation about immigration en-
forcement. More generally, it highlights the oft-overlooked similarities be-
tween the structure of modern criminal and immigration enforcement—
similarities that should, but have not yet, lead to the integration of scholar-
ship on the two subjects. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on Se-
cure Communities and the broader ongoing integration of criminal and im-
migration enforcement. Part II lays out and tests our hypotheses. Part III ex-
plores the implications of our findings. 
I.  INTEGRATING THE CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
Immigration and crime have been intimately linked in American law and 
politics for over a century. In 1875, the first restrictive immigration law 
passed by the federal government prohibited the entry of certain criminals 
and suspected prostitutes.2 When Congress began adopting deportation laws 
in the early twentieth century, “criminal aliens” were again among the first 
targeted by the government.3 And over the last twenty-five years the focus on 
deporting those who commit crimes has expanded dramatically. Today a 
broad swath of criminal convictions can make a noncitizen deportable—
convictions ranging from serious offenses such as murder to minor drug 
crimes and other misdemeanors.4 
While the connection between criminal convictions and immigration 
consequences is nearly as old as federal immigration law itself, over the last 
few decades a new sort of connection has developed between immigration 
law and criminal law. This new linkage concerns the enforcement bureaucra-
cies of criminal and immigration law, rather than the primary rules of con-
duct that regulate noncitizens. 

 2 See Page Act of 1875 § 1, ch 141, 18 Stat 477. The statute prohibited certain felons and prosti-
tutes from immigrating to the United States and criminalized the importation of prostitutes and “cooly” 
labor. Page Act §§ 3–5, 18 Stat at 477–48. 
 3 See Immigration Act of 1917 § 19, Pub L No 64-301, ch 29, 39 Stat 874, 889–90: 
[Making deportable] any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one 
year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, com-
mitted within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is hereafter 
sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this coun-
try of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry. 
See also Immigration Act of 1907 § 3, Pub L No 59-96, ch 1134, 34 Stat 898, 899–900 (making deportable 
women who engaged in prostitution within three years after entering the United States). 
 4 See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan 
L Rev 809, 836–39 (2007). 
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There is a growing convergence between the enforcement systems for 
immigration law and criminal law. This convergence is at odds with an old, 
conventional view about these regulatory domains. According to this old 
view, criminal law is the province of the states, while immigration law is ex-
clusively within the control of the federal government. The old view was real-
ly never quite right.5 Nonetheless, it was prominent in both regulatory prac-
tice and academic commentary for many decades. Recently, however, a host 
of factors—including a rise in unauthorized immigration and new thinking 
about cooperative federalism—have led to two prominent developments that 
challenge this neat division of labor. 
The first development is the rise of state and local efforts to combat un-
lawful migration. Examples include Texas’s attempt in the 1970s to deny free 
public school education to undocumented children,6 California’s bid in the 
1990s to deny a variety of government benefits to all out-of-status nonciti-
zens,7 and the recent efforts by Arizona and a handful of other state to arrest, 
prosecute, and otherwise single out potentially deportable immigrants for dis-
favorable treatment.8 These efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Many ef-
forts were blocked in their entirety: the Supreme Court struck down Texas’s 
statute in Plyler v Doe as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,9 and 
lower courts initially blocked California’s Proposition 187 before the state 
abandoned its defense of the law.10 More recently, the Supreme Court re-
buffed Arizona’s high-profile effort to get involved in enforcing immigration 
law. Earlier this summer, the Court struck down all but one of the central 
provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070,11, handing a big victory to the federal gov-
ernment and reaffirming a strong view of federal supremacy over immigra-
tion policy.12  

 5 For an discussion of the old view and the argument that it was not correct, see Gerald 
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 Colum L Rev 1833, 1839–
40 (1993) (discussing the “myth” of exclusive federal, as opposed to state, authority over immigration and 
arguing that it ought to be dispelled). 
 6 See 1975 Tex Sess Law Serv 896, codified at Tex Educ Code Ann § 21.031 (Vernon 1975), inval-
idated by Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202 (1982) (specifying that public schools should only admit children who 
are United States citizens or legal immigrants). 
 7 See 1994 Cal Legis Serv Prop 187 (West) (excluding “illegal aliens” from various public services 
including publicly-funded health care and public schools). 
 8 See, for example, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070), 2010 
Ariz Sess Laws 113, as amended by Immigration and Border Security; Providing for Conditional Enact-
ment, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211  
 9 457 US 202, 230 (1982) (holding that denying education to children necessitates a showing that it 
furthers some substantial state interest and that such a showing had not been made). 
 10 See, , League of United Latin American Citizens v Wilson, 997 F Supp 1244, 1261 (CD Cal 1997) 
(finding most of Proposition 187 preempted by the federal immigration regulatory scheme); Patrick J. 
McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles, LA Times A1 (July 29, 1999) 
(explaining that the California governor decided not to appeal the Wilson decision). 
 11 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 113. 
 12 132 S Ctat 2510. 
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While these state and local initiatives have garnered most of the public 
and scholarly attention, they are in some ways a sideshow to a second devel-
opment: the federal government’s incorporation of the state criminal en-
forcement bureaucracy into the federal immigration enforcement system. 
This incorporation, which has roots that date back many decades, began 
picking up speed in the 1990s, when Congress passed statute authorizing the 
Attorney General to deputize state and local law enforcement officials to en-
force immigration law.13 Under this statutory provision, § 287(g) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney General has authorized 
local police in nearly seventy-five jurisdictions around the country to screen 
prisoners for immigration violations and, in some cases, to assist in street-
level immigration enforcement.14 These cooperative arrangements have been 
complemented by the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), under which federal 
immigration agents (rather than local police) interview arrestees in federal, 
state, and local jails and prisons to identify potentially deportable nonciti-
zens.15 As of early 2009, all foreign-born prisoners at roughly 14 percent of 
local jails and prisons were screened by ICE agents.16 
Secure Communities, a new program launched in the fall of 2008, builds 
on these preliminary efforts at cooperative federalism. Its basic aim is in 
some ways quite similar to the earlier programs: like CAP and most 287(g) 
agreements, the goal is to provide immigration screening for people arrested 
by local law enforcement. But the scale of the program is dramatically differ-
ent. While 287(g) agreements were in effect in fewer than seventy-five juris-
dictions, and CAP was limited to screening prisoners in a tiny fraction of lo-
cal jails (and then only if the prisoners had already been identified as foreign-
born),17 Secure Communities is vastly more ambitious: under the program, 
every single person arrested by a local law enforcement official anywhere in 
the country will soon be screened by the federal government for immigration 

 13 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 133, Pub L No 104-
208, 110 Stat 3009, 3009-563 to -564, codified at INA § 287(g).  
 14 See Randy Capps, et al, Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigra-
tion Enforcement 9 (Migration Policy Institute Jan 2011), online at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012). 
 15 See Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for 
Crimes, 27 Yale J Reg 47, 73 (2010) (describing CAP’s variety of programs aimed at both screening prison 
inmates and, where necessary, obtaining removal orders against them prior to their release from the crimi-
nal system). 
 16 See US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; 
Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress—First Quarter 3 (US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Feb 
17, 2009), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy091stquarter.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012). 
 17 See notes 14-16. 
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violations. In short, Secure Communities is the largest expansion of local in-
volvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history.18 
To provide screening in local jails and prisons, Secure Communities re-
lies on a fundamentally different—and much less labor-intensive—approach 
than 287(g) agreements or CAP. Those programs required individual police 
officers or ICE agents to interview each prisoner personally in order to col-
lect information and assess the person’s status.19 In contrast, the backbone of 
Secure Communities is an information sharing arrangement that permits ICE 
to use biometric identification to flag suspected immigration violators. 
Traditionally, whenever a person is arrested and booked by a state or lo-
cal law enforcement agency, his fingerprints are taken and forwarded elec-
tronically to the FBI. The FBI compares those prints against various national 
criminal information databases that return a “hit” if the person has a criminal 
history or outstanding warrants.20 Under Secure Communities, the federal 
government forwards to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the 
fingerprints already being routed to the FBI. DHS then compares the per-
son’s fingerprints against a database designed to identify persons who have 
outstanding immigration violations, such as persons who are unlawfully in 
the country because they have overstayed their visas, or because they have 
been previously deported and have not been legally readmitted.21 If the data-

 18 The program appears set to supplant some of the earlier, more limited efforts at cooperation. 
For example, the Obama administration recently suggested that it will not renew its existing 287(g) agree-
ments, instead letting them expire at the end of 2012. See Alan Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Pro-
gram to Be Shut Down, USA Today (Feb 17, 2012), online at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-17/immigration-enforcement-
program/53134284/1 (visited Oct 27, 2012) (explaining that DHS will not renew contracts with many 
local police agencies and will not sign new agreements). Explaining this decision, DHS emphasized that it 
prefers to channel local participation in immigration enforcement through Secure Communities. See id. 
 19 For many years CAP therefore required ICE agents to travel to each local jail for interviews. In 
recent years in-person interviews have been replaced in some instances by remote interviews via telephone 
or videoconferencing equipment. But this streamlining still requires an available staff of ICE agents to 
conduct the interviews remotely—a need that led to the creation of the Detention Enforcement and Pro-
cessing Offenders by Remote Technology (DEPORT) Center in Chicago—and, for videoconferencing, 
requires the installation of equipment in each local jail. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Le-
gal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 Yale J Reg 47, 73 (2010) (describing the vide-
oconferencing technology used by DEPORT). 
 20 See David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, 77 The 
Police Chief 40, 43 (Sept 2010) (explaining the standard process for sending fingerprints to the FBI and 
how Secure Communities enhances this system). 
 21 The Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”) database used by DHS is in some 
ways different than the criminal history databases relied on by the FBI because IDENT is designed to 
include records for lawful immigrants. The database includes all recent lawful immigrants, who have fin-
gerprints taken at the point of entry to the United States, as well as noncitizens who have had previous 
contact with ICE (perhaps because they were arrested, placed in removal proceedings, or previously re-
moved to another country). See US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology  Program (US-
VISIT), Biometric Standards Requirements for US-VISIT: Version 1.0 1 (DHS Mar 15, 2010), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_biometric_standards.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (de-
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base flags an arrestee as a potential immigration violator, ICE’s Law En-
forcement Support Center (LESC) assesses the person’s status based on all 
available information; the ICE district office then decides whether to place a 
detainer on the person.22 The detainer requests that the local agency hold the 
person for forty-eight hours in order to permit ICE to transfer the person to 
federal custody for the initiation of deportation proceedings.23 
Secure Communities thus uses information sharing and biometric iden-
tity matching to dramatically reduce the labor required to screen arrestees. 
Nonetheless, while the technology made it conceivable that ICE could screen 
every arrestee in the country, it did not entirely automate the process of iden-
tifying and charging those believed to be in violation of immigration law. Da-
tabase matches must still be evaluated by ICE agents trained to determine 
whether a noncitizen flagged by the database can be charged with being re-
movable—a process that requires technicians at ICE’s LESC to compile and 
analyze information from multiple databases, and in some cases could con-
ceivably require that the suspect be interviewed.24 This status determination 
must be made quickly enough for ICE to take action to apprehend the sus-
pect while he remains in local police custody. Moreover, even if the suspect 
is deemed removable, local ICE offices must still determine whether charg-

scribing IDENT as “US-VISIT’s biometric database”); DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Auto-
mated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) 2 (July 31, 2006), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) 
(noting that the IDENT database maintains records of the biometric data of persons “encountered in 
DHS mission-related processes”).Because the database includes lawful immigrants, and even some immi-
grants who have since naturalized, a match in the database is not itself conclusive evidence that the ar-
restee is potentially deportable. Moreover, because some unlawful migrants have never had contact with 
ICE, a no-match in the database is not conclusive evidence that the person is a citizen or lawfully present. 
 22 See ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 3–4 (cited in note 16) 
(explaining how LESC provides information on aliens for local law enforcement agencies); ICE, 1st Quar-
terly Status Report (April–June 2008) for Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and 
Remove Criminal Aliens 7(DHS Aug 2008), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy081stquarter.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012). 
 23 See 8 CFR § 287.7  
 24 See ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7 (cited in note 22). For this reason, 
Secure Communities’ relationship to the CAP program is quite complicated. It can be seen as a successor 
program to CAP, as a program operating in tandem with CAP, or as a biometric component of CAP itself, 
and agency documents sometimes describe the relationship between the programs in each of these three 
ways. See Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure? Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 
8, 11–13 (2011) (statement of Gary Mead, Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, ICE) (“Secure Communities Oversight Hearing”) (describing Secure Communities as a suc-
cessor to CAP, designed to address the latter’s shortcomings); ICE, Secure Communities: A Comprehen-
sive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens; Strategic Plan 2–3 (DHS July 21, 2009), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf (visited Oct 
27, 2012) (explaining the biometric data aspect of Secure Communities); ICE 1st Quarterly Status Report 
(April–June 2008) at 2 (cited in note 22)(describing Secure Communities as complementing CAP’s opera-
tions). 
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ing the suspect is consistent with the agency’s use of prosecutorial discretion, 
and must locate transportation resources and bed space necessary to take the 
person into custody.25 These resource bottlenecks—combined with certain 
other technological challenges and the sheer scope of the task of communi-
cating with the roughly thirty-one thousand booking locations around the 
country—all but guaranteed that simultaneous nationwide activation of Se-
cure Communities was not an option.26 
Instead, ICE rolled out the program, county by county, over the course 
of the last four years. The first handful of counties was activated on October 
27, 2008.27 Each month new counties have been added, and as of August 
2012 3,074 counties—almost 97 percent of all of the counties in the United 
States—had been incorporated into Secure Communities.28 Only 107 coun-
ties remained to be activated at the close of August, and ICE stated in May 
that it planned to activate all remaining stragglers in short order—well ahead 
of the rollout’s initial timetable.29 
While Secure Communities’ activation has been staggered rather than 
simultaneous, the decision about which counties to activate first has been en-
tirely the federal government’s. This is also quite a departure from the earlier 
efforts at cooperative immigration enforcement, such as the 287(g) program. 
Under that program, individual states and local governments themselves de-
cided whether they wanted to opt into the program. Unless both the local 
government and the Department of Justice agreed on the terms of coopera-

 25 See ICE, Second Congressional Status Report Covering the Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2008 for 
Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 20–23 (DHS Nov 
7, 2008), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy084thquarter.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 28, 2012) ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7 (cited in note 22). 
 26 See, for example, ICE, Second Congressional Status Report: Fourth Quarter FY 2008at 9–10 
(cited in note 25) (noting the difficulties of coordinating among the wide variety of practices at tens of 
thousands of booking locations across the United States); ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 
2008)  at 7 (cited in note 22) (explaining various operational difficulties in implementing Secure Communi-
ties). Among the technological hurdles included the fact that many local jurisdictions did not have live 
scan fingerprint devices when the rollout commenced in 2008. See ICE, Second Congressional Status Re-
port: Fourth Quarter FY 2008 at 10–11 (cited in note 25) 
 27 See ICE, Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability; Monthly Statistics through Sep-
tember 30, 2011 1 (DHS Oct 14, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (noting that the first 
county to be activated, Harris County, Texas, was activated on October 27, 2008); ICE, Secure Communi-
ties: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 4–5 (cited in note 16)(listing counties in the initial de-
ployment). Prior to that date, ICE operated a pilot program in a handful of counties in order to prepare 
for broader deployment. Id at 4 (listing Boston, MA; Dallas County, TX; Harris County, TX; Wake Coun-
ty, NC; Henderson County, NC; Buncombe County, NC; and Gaston County, NC as early participants). 
 28 See ICE, Activated Jurisdictions (DHS Aug 22, 2012), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (visited Oct 26, 2012).  
 29 See Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, NY 
Times A10 (May 12, 2012) (noting that ICE officials sent emails to officials in states resistant to Secure 
Communities stating that the program would be implemented shortly in all outstanding jurisdictions). 
	
		

	

 12/12/12
110  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:NNN 
  
tion, no arrangement under § 287(g)was possible.30 In contrast, under Secure 
Communities counties are selected for activation by DHS regardless of 
whether they wish to participate.31 Moreover, once activated, a local law en-
forcement agency has no real means of shirking or otherwise declining to 
participate in the program. As we explained above, the fingerprints that form 
the basis of the biometric identity check in Secure Communities are the very 
same fingerprint records that are provided by the local law enforcement 
agency to the FBI for purposes of criminal background checks. There is no 
way for a local government to forward these fingerprints for criminal pur-
poses but prevent the FBI from sharing them with DHS. As a result, the only 
way for a local law enforcement agency to prevent the immigration check 
from taking place would be to stop fingerprintingaltogether suspects who are 
arrested and booked into custody. It goes without saying that this is not an 
option for local law enforcement.32 
The mandatory nature of Secure Communities was not initially made 
public.33 When it was, swift criticism followed by some public officials and 
civil rights organizations.34 Nonetheless, this feature of the program is advan-
tageous from a research perspective. Because state and local governments 
cannot decline activation as a legal matter or avoid participation as a practical 

 30 INA § 287(g).  
 31 See Preston, Resistance Widens, NY Times at A11 (cited in note Error! Bookmark not de-
fined.) (referring to the ICE Director’s announcement that the consent of local jurisdictions was not nec-
essary for the federal government to implement Secure Communities). 
 32 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that there is nothing that local governments can do to 
resist the program. As one of us has written about elsewhere, and as we are exploring in other aspects of 
this project, local law enforcement agencies could resist participation by changing their arrest or bail prac-
tices. See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U Chi L Rev *60–61 
(forthcoming 2012).  
 33 See Office of Inspector General, Communication Regarding Participation in Secure Communi-
ties 4 (DHS Mar 2012), online at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-66_Mar12.pdf 
(visited Oct 27, 2012) (detailing the failure of DHS to provide clear guidance to the public and state and 
local governments regarding the mandatory nature of the program). 
 34 See, for example, National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), Insecure Communities: 
Press Packet; Uncovering the Truth and Understanding the Deceptive Deportation Program *4–11 
(2011), online at http://ndlon.org/pdf/scommbrief.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (gathering information 
critical of Secure Communities, particularly its mandatory nature); Uncover The Truth: ICE and Police 
Collaborations (Center for Constitution Rights, NDLON, and Cardozo Law School 2012), online at 
http://uncoverthetruth.org (visited Oct 6, 2012) (advocating for the end of Secured Communities and 
other immigration policies). Part of what generated confusion about the mandatory nature was that DHS 
initially adopted a practice of entering into Memoranda of Understanding with state governments (though 
not with local governments or law enforcement agencies) prior to activation. As soon as some states be-
gan to resist signing these agreements, however, the government made clear that the agreements were not 
required because the program required no actions by state or local officials; all that was required was a 
rerouting of the fingerprint data stream among the federal agencies. See Preston, Resistance Widens, NY 
Times at A11 (cited in note Error! Bookmark not defined.); NDLON, Insecure Communities at *4–11 
(cited in note 34). 
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matter, activation provides more complete information about the federal 
government’s priorities. 
To provide an initial sense of the deliberate nature of DHS’s selection 
of communities for activation, Figure 1 shows the sequence of county activa-
tions each month from October 2008 through July 2012. The left scale re-
ports the number of new activations in each month; the right reports the 
cumulative number of activated counties. The program spread slowly in its 
first eighteen months. During that period, twenty or fewer counties were ac-
tivated in each month. After a sharp spike in activations in June 2010, the 
program spread more rapidly. During the second eighteen months of the 
program, nearly one hundred counties were activated in each month. By the 
summer of 2011, roughly half of counties nationwide had been activated. Be-
ginning in October 2011 and continuing to May 2012, the pace of activations 
accelerated once again.  During this period, more than one hundred counties 
were activated in each month. By the summer of 2012, the number of 
monthly activations fell precipitously, with no activations occurring in some 
months, because very few counties that had not already been activated re-
mained. By July 2012, the end of our study period, 97% of counties were ac-
tive participants in Secure Communities. 
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FIGURE 1.  NUMBER OF COUNTIES ACTIVATED UNDER SECURE 
COMMUNITIES: OCTOBER 28, 2008–JULY 31, 2012 
While Figure 1 shows how the pace of activation has accelerated over 
time, what it cannot show is the dramatic way in which early and late activa-
tions differed. Figure 2 highlights these changes by mapping the cumulative 
activations in each twelve-month period following the beginning of the 
rollout. As the maps make clear, over time activations became much lumpier, 
with multiple counties within the same state frequently activated on the same 
date. During the program’s first year the number of monthly activations was 
quite small. With such small numbers, it was rare for multiple counties within 
the same state to activate at the same time. Instead, scattered counties around 
the country were singled out for activation. As the rollout of the program 
progressed, however, it became increasingly common for several counties 
within one state to be activated simultaneously. And over time, more and 
more of these mass activations had the effect of bringing all the remaining 
inactive counties within a state into Secure Communities. In other words, 
early in the program’s rollout activations can truly be characterized as county 
by county, while at the tail end of the rollout some activations were nearly 
statewide events. 
	
		

	

 12/12/12
2013] Policing Immigration 113 
 
FIGURE 2.  PATTERN OF SECURE COMMUNITIES ACTIVATION  
 
 
To get a better numerical sense for this pattern of mass activations, Ta-
ble 1 reports the frequency of simultaneous activation events according to 
the proportion of counties within a state activated simultaneously and how 
far into Secure Communities’ rollout the activation event occurred. The pat-
tern is unmistakable. Mass activation events have become increasingly fre-
quent as Secure Communities has neared its goal of nationwide coverage. For 
example, consider instances in which at least half of the counties in a state 
activated on the same day and, in so doing, brought the entire state into ac-
tive status. No such events occurred during the first year of the program, but 
they have become increasingly frequent during later years. During the second 
year of the program, such mass-activation events occurred in two states and 
involved forty-six counties, which constituted 8 percent of counties activated 
during that year. During the third year of the program, such mass-activation 
events occurred in five states, and they included 208 counties or 23 percent 
of all counties activated during that period. In the last 10 months included in 
this study, such mass activations occurred in 26 states, encompassing 1,328 
counties—over 90 percent of counties activated during that period. And as 
the table shows, the pattern remains unchanged regardless of the threshold 
chosen to define mass-activation events; raising it to 75 percent of a state’s 
counties or lowering it to 25 percent does not alter the conclusion that early 
activations show a distinctly different pattern than later activations. 
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TABLE 1.  FREQUENCY OF MASS ACTIVATIONS BRINGING ENTIRE STATE 
INTO ACTIVE STATUS 
 
 Months since Launch of Secure  
Communities in October 2008 
 
Percent of Counties in the State  
Activating on Same Date 
12 or few-
er months 
(1) 
13–24 
months 
(2) 
25–36 
months 
(3) 
37–46 
months 
(4) 
25%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 92 213 1,438 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All  Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 16.2% 23.7% 97.6% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete  Activation through 
  these Mass Activations 
0 3 7 30 
50%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 46 208 1,328 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All  Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 8.1% 23.1% 90.3% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete  Activation through 
  these Mass Activations 
0 2 5 26 
75%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 3 159 1,051 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All  Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 0.5% 17.7% 71.4% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete  Activation through 
  these Mass Activations 
0 1 4 22 
Total Number of Counties  
 Activated Nationwide during  this  Period 
83 569 900 1,471 
 
Figures 1 and 2, as well as Table 1, thus reveal a distinct evolution in the 
pattern of activation. In the first eighteen months or so of the program, the 
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pace of activations was slow, and early activations tended to pick off one or 
two counties within a state. The government did not seek to activate an en-
tire state before moving on to another state. Instead, it carefully selected just 
one or two counties in each state for activation. Later on, as the pace of acti-
vations sped up, the process of selecting counties for activation clearly 
changed. The government did not simply accelerate the activation of scat-
tered counties. Instead, the government shifted to mass activations in which 
all inactive counties remaining in a state were activated on the same date. 
This manner of activation implied a much quicker rate of adoption; in the 
last twelve months of our observation period, more counties were activated 
than during the first thirty months of the program. It also suggests that early 
activations were more deliberate and targeted. 
II.  THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF TARGETED ENFORCEMENT 
The pattern of Secure Communities’ activation provides unique insight 
into the way a large, nationwide law enforcement agency wields discretion in 
order to satisfy its programmatic and political objectives. Constrained by lim-
ited resources, where did ICE initially concentrate its enforcement efforts? 
As a result of those decisions, what types of immigrants were most likely to 
be targeted by the program? 
To develop hypothesis about Secure Communities’ rollout strategy, it 
makes sense to begin with the public justifications for the program. As one 
might suspect from the name Secure Communities, agency officials have ar-
gued publicly that the program is designed to target enforcement resources at 
“criminal aliens” and to reduce crime.35 When the program was unveiled in 
March 2008, it was described as “a multi-year initiative to more effectively 
identify, detain, and return removable criminal aliens.”36 This goal has been 
repeated time and again in press releases, in quarterly reports, and by agency 
officials from the head of Secure Communities up to Janet Napolitano, the 
Secretary of DHS.37 
Prioritizing the removal of criminal offenders can be understood in two 
different ways. First, it may simply reflect the reality of resource constraints. 
As John Morton, the Director of ICE, has noted repeatedly, the government 

 35 See Secure Communities Oversight Hearing, 112th Cong, 1st Sess at 11(statement of Gary 
Mead)(cited in note 24)51 DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border 
Security and Immigration Enforcement (Oct 5, 2011), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategy-and-immigration-
enforcement.shtm (visited Oct 27, 2012). 
 36 ICE, Press Release, ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nation-
wide (DHS Mar 28, 2008), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0804/080414washington.htm 
(visited Oct 27, 2012). 
 37 See note 35 (citing statements made by Executive Associate Director of ICE Gary Mead and 
Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano). 
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lacks the resources to remove every noncitizen who is in violation of immi-
gration law.38 The government must therefore decide which noncitizens in 
this large pool should be targets for deportation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
noncitizens who have committed serious crimes regularly top the list. 
Second, Secure Communities’ focus on criminal offenders may reflect 
the administration’s determination that not all noncitizens who are in viola-
tion of immigration law should be deported. Recently the government has 
made explicit what has long been clear: that there is a distinction between 
those immigrants who are formally deportable and those whom the govern-
ment actually wants to expend resources trying to deport.39 Huge numbers of 
noncitizens are technically deportable, in part because the grounds of deport-
ability have expanded dramatically over the years. But not all technically de-
portable noncitizens are considered undesirable by the government.40 In fact 
ICE Director John Morton recently formalized this fact. Last June, he prom-
ulgated a memorandum on prosecutorial discretion directing line agents to 
decline to initiate removal proceedings against some noncitizens who are 
technically deportable, and describing in detail the factors that should be 
weighed in making the charging decision.41 Around the same time, ICE also 
initiated a review of over 300 thousand pending deportation proceedings to 
decide which should be terminated.42 And most recently, President Barack 
Obama announced that the administration would not seek to deport hun-
dreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants who came to the United States 
as children and have led successful lives.43 

 38 See, for example, John Morton, Director, ICE, Memorandum for all Field Office Directors, Spe-
cial Agents in Charge, Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immi-
gration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 
(June 17, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (noting that prosecutorial discretion in instituting immigration proceed-
ings against aliens is necessary because of the limited resources of ICE). 
 39 See Julia Preston and John H. Cushman Jr, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., 
NY Times A1 (June 16, 2012) (explaining the Obama administration’s recent decision to not seek deporta-
tion for certain young illegal immigrants). For one explanation of why the government might affirmatively 
prefer for some resident noncitizens to lack legal status, see Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 851 (cited 
in note 4) (explaining that granting noncitizens legal status would decrease flexibility for the government 
in terms of immigration screening processes). 
 40 In some ways this parallels the argument frequently made about American criminal law—that a 
large gap exists between legal and moral culpability. See, for example, William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice 1–8 (Belknap 2011); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the 
Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum L Rev 1655, 1658–1661 (2010).  
 41 See Morton, Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion at 2–5 (cited in note 38). 
 42 See Christopher Goffard, Paloma Esquivel, and Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Will Review Cases of 
Illegal Migrants: Low-Risk Individuals, Including Students, the Elderly, and Crime Victims, Might Be Able 
to Avoid Deportation, LA Times A1 (Aug 19, 2011).  
 43 See Preston and Cushman, Obama to Permit Young Migrants, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 
39); Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Memorandum for David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Commissioner US Customs and Border Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, US Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, John Morton, Director, ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
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If Secure Communities is designed to target serious criminals in order to 
make communities more secure, as the government argues, than one would 
expect the rollout to reflect that fact. Without the ability to activate every-
where simultaneously, the government was forced to choose which commu-
nities to activate first. One prediction is that the government would bring the 
program online first in counties with the biggest crime problems—that is, 
places with the highest crime rates, or perhaps the highest rates of violent 
crime. Indeed, the executive director of Secure Communities has stated that 
the rollout would “initially focus[] on jurisdictions that have the highest esti-
mated volumes of criminal aliens or criminal activity while remaining flexi-
ble.”44 Of course, as the statement notes, the focus might not be only on 
counties that have high crime rates if the goal is to reduce crime using a pro-
gram that incapacitates and deters only noncitizens. Instead, the agency 
might target communities that have both a high crime rate and a large num-
ber of noncitizens. Or the agency might employ more elaborate strategies to 
predict which communities have the highest numbers of noncitizens engaged 
in criminal activity. The strategic planning documents undergirding Secure 
Communities purport to do just this: they speak about the development of a 
“risk-based” rollout strategy that prioritizes activation in part based on a 
model designed to predict the number of noncitizens who will be arrested by 
local law enforcement.45 While details about this model have not been made 
publicly available, crime-rate data appears to be a central component.46 

Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (announcing the policy of prosecutorial discretion to not institute 
removal proceedings against certain young migrants). 
 44 Venturella, 77 The Police Chief at 44 (cited in note 20) (emphasis added) (laying out the basic 
elements of Secure Communities and plans for its development). This statement suggests a focus on crime 
rates—though it also suggests that rollout was sufficiently “flexible” to incorporate non-crime-related fac-
tors. It also highlights that, in addition to focusing on areas with high levels of “criminal activity,” the 
agency might target areas with the highest rates of crime by noncitizens, or with large numbers of “crimi-
nal aliens.”See id.  While in practice the rate of immigrant offending is unknown, the government might 
pursue this strategy by targeting areas with both (a) high crime rates and (b) a high fraction of noncitizen 
population. We discuss this possibility below. See Part II.C. In future work, we will show that the serial 
nature of the Secure Communities rollout makes it possible to draw inferences about the rate of immi-
grant offending. 
 45 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2010, Hearing on Priorities Enforcing 
Immigration Law before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the House Committee on Appropri-
ations, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 915, 943, 953 (2009) (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director of 
Secure Communities, ICE)(“Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law Hearing”) (indicating that increased 
deployment of biometric identification technology would result in more data, which would allow ICE to 
target priority areas with more precision, enabling them to “predict and forecast the locations where we 
may encounter the greatest numbers of current and future criminal alien populations”); ICE, Secure 
Communities: Strategic Plan at 2–3 (cited in note 24) (indicating that the agency was “initiating risk-based 
deployment to cover increasing percentages of the estimated criminal alien population”); ICE, 1st Quar-
terly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7–8 (cited in note 22) (explaining that the risk-based implementa-
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Despite its moniker, of course, crime reduction and public safety is not 
the only plausible goal Secure Communities might be designed to pursue. 
While this has been the agency’s standard justification for the program, many 
critics of Secure Communities have argued that the government is instead 
using Secure Communities to target “illegal immigration,” or simply to make 
deportations cheaper.47 Reducing the cost of immigration enforcement is 
clearly one advantage of tacking mandatory immigration screening onto every 
local arrest. If efficiency were the goal, one would predict that the govern-
ment would initially direct the program’s limited resources to areas with large 
numbers of noncitizens who are in violation of immigration law, regardless 
of whatever they had engaged in criminal activity. Relatedly, the government 
might target areas with large numbers of unauthorized migrants, or some 
other subset of all immigration violators. In fact, ICE itself has repeatedly 

tion plan for Secure Communities is determined at least partly on historical data on violent criminal al-
iens). 
 46 See ICE, Criminal Alien Population Projection Analysis (CAPPA) Projected Arrests and Releas-
es—County Level (DHS Nov 2010), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/cappa-projected-
arrests-releases-county-level.xls (visited Oct 27, 2012) (forecasting, in an Excel document, annual nonciti-
zen releases from the custody of non-ICE law enforcement). According to agency documents, the 
CAPPA analysis included FBI violent crime statistics for 2007; 2000 US Census percentages of foreign-
born, noncitizen populations; apprehensions and charging documents issued by ICE’s own Detention and 
Removal Operations (DRO); and “CAP Limited Coverage, High-Risk Assessment for Tier 2 facilities,” 
presumably some internal analysis drawn from Tier 2 (second highest-risk) federal, state, and local prisons 
and jails. ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 30 (cited in note 16) (list-
ing several factors in determining the criminal alien population, and thus the relative need for Secure 
Communities, in various locations). Later congressional reports note refinements to the model. See, for 
example, ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress—Third 
Quarter 26 (DHS Aug 27, 2009), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy093rdquarter.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012) (describing recent attempts to both leverage new sources of data and verify existing data 
in order to refine criminal alien population estimates); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal 
Year 2009 Report to Congress—Second Quarter 26 (DHS June 1, 2009), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy092ndquarter.pdf (vis-
ited Oct 27, 2012) (noting that ICE is compiling statistics from surveys of jails and prisons in order to 
further refine criminal alien population estimates). 
 47 See, for example, Pat Quinn, Governor of Illinois, Letter to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant Direc-
tor of Secure Communities, Secure Communities Program 1 (May 4, 2011), online at 
http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/sc_ill.pdf (visited Oct 27,, 2012) (pointing out that while 
the agency had implied that only those aliens convicted for serious offenses would be targeted by Secure 
Communities, “more than 30% of those deported from the United States, under the program, have never 
been convicted of any crime, much less a serious one”);Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to 
Obama’s Immigration Strategy, NY Times A18 (May 6, 2011) (describing the criticism of Secure Commu-
nities by various state officials who do not want the program implemented in their jurisdictions); ACLU 
Statement on Secure Communities, ACLU Blog of Rights (ACLU Nov 10, 2010), online at 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-statement-secure-communities (visited Oct 27, 2012) (out-
lining the chief criticisms related to the “nationwide controversy” over Secure Communities); Dan Frosch, 
In Colorado, Debate Over Program to Check Immigration History of the Arrested, NY Times A16 (July 
30, 2010) (quoting Cheryl Little, Executive Director for the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center in Miami: 
“ICE claims, as it has done for years, that it is targeting dangerous criminals. Yet the program screens the 
fingerprints of anyone arrested by local police, not just those convicted of crimes”). 
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identified one set of immigration violators as a target of Secure Communi-
ties:“[R]epeat violators who game the immigration system, those who fail to 
appear at immigration hearings, and fugitives who have already been ordered 
removed by an immigration judge.”48 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the government to target di-
rectly communities with large numbers of immigrant violators or unauthor-
ized immigrants. There are no reliable local measures of immigrant violators 
generally, or even of unauthorized population specifically. The national esti-
mates of unauthorized population produced by the Pew Center and other or-
ganizations are subject to considerable uncertainty, and that uncertainty mul-
tiplies if one attempts to decompose the numbers into smaller units of geog-
geography.49 For this reason, states are the smallest units for which the Pew 
Center produces estimates of unauthorized population.50 
Nonetheless, were the government interested in targeting the unauthor-
ized it could rely on other variables that are correlated with the unauthorized 
population. Proximity to the southern border is one potential correlate, given 
that a large fraction of unauthorized migrants enter across the southern bor-
der and live in border regions.51 A second is a community’s noncitizen or 

 48 ICE, Secure Communities: The Basics (DHS Aug 31, 2012), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/#top (visited Oct 27, 2012). See also ICE, Secure Communi-
ties: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress—First Quarter 7 (DHS Mar 1, 2011), online 
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy111stquarter.pdf 
(visited Oct 27, 2012); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Con-
gress—First Quarter 6 (DHS Mar 1, 2010), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy101stquarter.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Second Quarter FY 2009 at 30 (cited in 
note 46) ; Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 26 (cited at note 16). 
 49  Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State 
Trends, 2010 3 (Pew Hispanic Center Feb 1, 2011), online at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012).  See also Michael Hoefer, 
Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the 
United States: January 2011 1 (DHS Office of Immigration Statistics Mar 2012), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012). 
 50 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States 1 
(Pew Hispanic Center Apr 14, 2009), online at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012) (. 
 51 See, for example, Passel and Cohn, Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants at 21 (cited in note 50) 
(noting that Mexicans make up the largest portion of unauthorized immigrants and that unauthorized 
Mexican immigrants are generally concentrated in the South and Southwest). DHS Secretary Janet Napoli-
tano officially made border areas a priority for activation in March 2009, when she announced the South-
west Border Security Initiative. But her stated reason for this prioritization was to “crack down on Mexi-
can drug cartels and target the violence they are spawning.” DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano 
Announces Major Southwest Border Security Initiative (Mar 24, 2009), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1237909530921.shtm (visited Oct 27, 2012); Priorities Enforcing 
Immigration Law Hearing, 111th Cong, 1st Sess at 931–32 (statement of Mary M. Forman, Director of 
Office of Investigations, ICE) (cited in note 45) (describing Secretary Napolitano’s March 24, 2009 press 
release announcing the Southwest Border Security Initiative as a response to increased drug cartel violence 
in Mexico); DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano Announces Secure Communities Deployment to 
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foreign-born population—though the latter measure includes naturalized cit-
izens and both proxies includes lawful migrants as well as those who are in 
violation of immigration law. A third potential proxy is the size of a commu-
nity’s Hispanic population. Nearly half of all immigrants living in the United 
States today are of Hispanic origin, and more than three-quarters of all unau-
thorized immigrants are from Central or South America.52 
Of course, all of these proxies are both over- and under-inclusive. For 
example, while most unauthorized migrants are Hispanic, the vast majority of 
Hispanic residents in the U.S. are not unauthorized. Nonetheless, there is 
some evidence that the government is using imperfect proxies to evaluate 
progress under the rollout. In DHS’s 2011 appropriations report for Con-
gress, for example, the agency emphasized as a key Secure Communities ac-
complishment from 2009 the deployment of biometric technology to “ap-
proximately 31 percent of the estimated nationwide number of the 
foreign born non citizen population.” The goals for 2010 included “cover-
ing approximately 96 percent of the estimated nationwide number of the for-
eign born non citizen population.”53 Notably, the agency’s own chosen met-
ric here is not the population of immigration violators; nor is it the 
population of noncitizens engaged in criminal activity or convicted of crimes.  
Instead, the agency touts coverage of areas with large numbers of nonciti-
zens.54 We should note, of course, that the twin objectives of immigration 
and crime control are not mutually exclusive. One could imagine the pro-
gram pursuing both goals to a certain extent—perhaps a realistic assumption 
in a world where agency officials regularly single out both violent criminal 
offenders and repeat immigration offenders as the highest priority enforce-
ment targets. Moreover, as we noted above, even if the government’s ulti-

All Southwest Border Counties, Facilitating Identification and Removal of Convicted Criminal Aliens 
(Aug 10, 2010) online at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1281457837494.shtm (visited Oct 27, 
2012) (announcing the implementation of Secure Communities in twenty-five southwest border counties); 
Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Second Quarter FY 2009 at 8–9 (cited in note 46). See also Secure 
Communities Oversight Hearing, 112th Cong, 1st Sessat 13 (statement of Gary Mead) (cited in note 24) 
(“Since 2008, ICE has expanded . . . Secure Communities from 14 jurisdictions to more than 1,729 today, 
including every jurisdiction along the Southwest border.”) (emphasis added). 
 52 See Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2010, 
table 6 (Pew Hispanic Center Feb 21, 2012), online at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-born-population-in-the-
united-states-2010/#6(visited Oct 27, 2012) (showing that 18,817,105 of 39,916,875 immigrants reported 
their ethnicity as Hispanic); Passel and Cohn, Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants at 21 (cited in note 50) 
(noting that 59 percent of unauthorized migrants are from Mexico, 11 percent are from other Central 
American countries, and 7 percent are from South America). 
 53 Id at 68–69 (highlighting ICE plans for fiscal years 2010 and 2011). 
 54 ICE, Salaries and Expenses: Fiscal Year 2011; Overview—Congressional Justification 67–68 
(DHS), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/fy2011overviewcongressionaljustification.pdf (vis-
ited Oct 27, 2012) (highlighting key ICE achievements in fiscal year 2009). 
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mate focus were purely crime control, such a focus might not lead the gov-
ernment to rely exclusively on crime rates to determine rollout strategy. 
Nonetheless, these slightly different hypotheses about the government’s 
means and ends all point to the same broad conclusions about what we 
should expect of the rollout strategy: the crime reduction strategy leads to 
targeting communities with high crime rates, and the immigration enforce-
ment strategy leads to targeting communities with high levels of some proxy 
for immigration violators. 
In addition to potential programmatic objectives, such as targeting seri-
ous criminals or reducing the cost of immigration enforcement, political ob-
jectives or pressures may also have shaped the use of discretion in Secure 
Communities’ rollout. Some communities have applauded the idea of check-
ing immigration status as part of the criminal process.55 A number of states 
have even required such checks in the absence of any federal agreement or 
program.56 In contrast, other communities have objected to Secure Commu-
nities. They have argued that the program undermines community policing 
by making local citizens wary of the police and imposes significant detention 
costs on local governments asked to hold prisoners in local jails until ICE 
agents take custody.57 These complaints have garnered national media atten-
tion, with prominent governors such as Deval Patrick and Pat Quinn  argu-
ing that Secure Communities should not be implemented in their states.58 
If agency officials are sensitive to the possibility of political support or 
backlash against their program, as the literature on cooperative federalism 
suggests will often be the case,59 then we would predict that the program 
would be activated first in communities that supported increased immigra-
tion enforcement, with activation delayed for communities that opposed the 
enforcement measure. Here too, the hypothesis finds support in the agency’s 
public statements: agency documents state that early activation may be priori-

 55 See generally What Others Are Saying… about Secure Communities (ICE June 2011), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/what-others-say.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (collect-
ing comments supportive of Secure Communities from across the country). 
 56 See, for example, SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(B) (requiring law en-
forcement officials to check the immigration status of individuals they encounter in the course of their 
duties and whom they suspect are in violation of immigration law). 
 57 See, for example, Quinn, Letter, Secure Communities Program at 1 (cited in note 47). 
 58 See Deval L. Patrick, Hillel Moral Voices Lecture (Apr 30, 2012), online at 
http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/speeches/20120430-tufts-moral-voices-immigration.html 
(visited Oct 27, 2012); Elise Foley, Massachusetts Rejects Secure Communities Immigration Enforcement 
Program, Huffington Post (June 6, 2011), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/06/ 
massachusetts-rejects-immgration-enforcement-program_n_871970.html (visited Oct 27, 2012). 
 59 See, for example,  Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich L Rev 813, 816 (1998). 
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tized for those communities that have expressed an interest in partnering 
with ICE.60 
As a starting point, therefore, we approach the activation data with 
three quite different hypotheses about the role discretion may have played in 
the program’s implementation. Two of the hypotheses focus on the possibil-
ity that officials pursued implementation in places where the social need was 
considered greatest from a policy perspective—though the policy need can 
be understood in at least two different ways, depending on whether the focus 
is on serious criminals or not. The other hypothesis focuses on the possibility 
that officials pursued implementation in places where the political benefits 
were biggest and the risk of backlash the smallest. 
III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
To test these hypotheses, as well as other questions that we will explore 
in future work, we collected a large set of data related to both immigration 
and criminal enforcement.  For purposes of this article we assembled the da-
ta into a cross-section of of US counties.  For each county, the data include 
four large sets of information: 
 
Secure Communities operational data. Through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) request, we secured comprehensive statistics for Se-
cure Communities that ICE collected as part of its implementation of 
the program. When combined with publicly available data, these statis-
tics cover the period from October 2008 through July 2012. For this 
Article, the most relevant data provide the date on which Secure Com-
munities was activated in each county around the country. But the data 
are far richer than this. They also include a tremendous amount of op-
erational data concerning the program. On a county-by-month basis, 
the data include a wealth of information about the investigative, charg-
ing, and dispositional stages of enforcement, including: number of 
submissions; number of hits in the IDENT immigration database;61 
number of persons against whom ICE initiated removal proceedings; 
and number of removals. Moreover, this county-by-month data is fur-
ther broken down by offense category, making it possible to separate 
serious offenders from minor offenders from persons with no criminal 
convictions. 

 60 See ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7–8 (cited in note 22).  
 61 The IDENT database includes persons who have lawfully immigrated to the United States in 
recent years, as well as persons who have had an enforcement encounter with ICE. Thus, even over the 
time period it covers the IDENT database is both over- and under-inclusive as a source of information 
about immigration violators. Many lawful immigrants and citizens are in the database, and unauthorized 
migrants who have never been deported are unlikely to be in it. See note 21.  
	
		

	

 12/12/12
2013] Policing Immigration 123 
 
 
Demographic data. From the State and Census County QuickFacts 
file,62 we assembled a variety of county-level demographic data. These 
data include each county’s racial composition, foreign-born population, 
crime rate, level of wealth and poverty, population density, police force 
size, and level of support for the Republican presidential candidate in 
2004. 
 
Immigration lawmaking and enforcement data. Using publicly available 
data, we collected information on cooperative enforcement agreements 
entered into by local governments pursuant to § 287(g) of the INA. Us-
ing data generously provided by Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, 
we assembled information on recent state and local legislation relating 
to immigration enforcement.63 
 
Criminal enforcement data. From the Uniform Crime Reports, we as-
sembled data on both offending and arrest rates. These data are report-
ed each month by every law enforcement agency in the country. Both 
the offense and arrest data are broken down by offense type and pro-
vide information on the race of persons arrested (though the demo-
graphic information does not include coding on Hispanic origin). We 
aggregated individual law enforcement agency data up to the county 
level for the year 2007, the year before Secure Communities was im-
plemented.64 
A. The Basic Patterns 
To test our hypotheses about Secure Communities, we begin with some 
summary statistics about the differences between early- and late-activating 

 62  See USA Counties (US Census Bureau), online at http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml 
(visited Oct 15, 2012); USA Counties Information, (US Census Bureau), online at 
http://www.census.gov/support/USACdata.html (visited Oct 15, 2012). 
 63 This data was collected by Pham and Pham as part of their project studying the adoption of local 
immigration laws and the local political climate for migrants. For parts of their research, see generally-
Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local Immigration Regulation: An Empir-
ical Analysis, 32 Cardozo L Rev 485 (2010); Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate 
for Immigrants: A State-by-State Analysis, in Gabriel Jack Chin and Carissa Hessick, eds, Illegals in the 
Backyard: State and Local Regulation of Immigration Policy(NYU forthcoming 2012). 
 64 The FBI releases the Master Arrest and Offense files on a lagged basis, so 2011 data will not 
become available until late 2012 or early 2013. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: UCR Publication Sched-
ule (Tentative), online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/publication-schedule (visited Oct 27, 
2012) (providing the approximate dates on which various crime-related statistics and reports will be re-
leased by the FBI). 
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counties. The government has said repeatedly that it targeted high-priority 
areas for early activation. As a result, the counties in which Secure Communi-
ties was first activated provide revealing information about the government’s 
highest priorities for the program. Moreover, as we explained earlier, ICE ac-
tivated only a very small number of scattered counties in the first twelve 
months of the program—slightly more than 3 percent of all counties. The 
slow rollout of the program highlights the deliberateness of the choices made 
in launching the program and permits us to use county-level data about crime 
and demographics to see whether the rollout patterns are consistent with the 
various goals the government might have pursued. 
In these summary statistics we focus on our first two hypotheses: target-
ing crime and criminal violators on the one hand, and targeting immigration 
violators on the other. (We add our third hypothesis—targeting pockets of 
local political support—in the later sections.) Our prediction above was that 
the first goal would lead the government to target high-crime communities 
for early activation, while the second goal would lead the government to tar-
get proxies for immigration violators, such as border proximity, noncitizen 
population, or perhaps Hispanic population. 
TABLE 2. COMPARING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
EARLY AND LATER ACTIVIATING COUNTIES 
 
 
Characteristic 
Counties Activated within First 
12 Months of Program 
(1) 
Counties  
Activated Later 
(2) 
 
Difference of  
(1) – (2) 
County is on Southern  
 Border with Mexico 
.265 
(.078) 
.0023 
(.0014) 
.263** 
(.078) 
County is on the Gulf of 
 Mexico 
.133 
(.044) 
.015 
(.080) 
.118** 
(.038) 
Fraction of Population 
 Noncitizen 
.095 
(.007) 
.025 
(.003) 
.070** 
(.007) 
Fraction of Population  
 Hispanic 
.379 
(.091) 
.068 
(.016) 
.312** 
(.080) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 
 
5.832 
(.114) 
4.717 
(.207) 
1.115** 
(.240) 
Log Property Crime Rate 7.930 
(.072) 
6.917 
(.255) 
1.013** 
(.265) 
N 83 2,994 3,077 
**p<0.05Note: The table reports means, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 tests these simple predictions by comparing crime rates, frac-
tions of the noncitizen and Hispanic population, and border proximity by 
date of activation. The first row shows that counties activated within the first 
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twelve months of Secure Communities were concentrated along the southern 
border. Counties along the southern border with Mexico represent only 1 
percent of all US counties, but they accounted for nearly 27 percent of the 
counties activated during the first year of Secure Communities. After the first 
year, these border counties accounted for only about one-quarter of one per-
centage point of counties activated. The concentration of activations is un-
mistakable and highlights the fact that the overwhelming majority of counties 
along the southern border with Mexico were activated during Secure Com-
munities’ first year. Counties adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico were also more 
likely to activate during the first year of the program. 
The third and fourth rows show  that locations activated in the first year 
also had higher proportions of noncitizens and Hispanics in their popula-
tions. The magnitudes of these differences were substantial. Noncitizens ac-
counted for 9.5 percent of persons in counties activated during the first year 
of Secure Communities, compared to only 2.5 percent in counties activated 
later. In other words, the proportion of the noncitizens in communities acti-
vated earliest was more than three times that of communities activated later. 
The differences with respect to the proportion of Hispanics in the pop-
ulation were still larger. Hispanics constituted 37.9 percent of the population 
in early-activating counties and only 6.8 percent in counties activating later. 
That is, the fraction of Hispanics in counties activated during the first year of 
Secure Communities was more than five times that of counties activated lat-
er. A remarkable feature of this difference is that it cannot be fully explained 
by the concentration of early activations in border counties. Border counties 
comprise about 27 percent of early activations, and a higher fraction of their 
population is Hispanic than the average among other counties. Yet, even if 
border counties were populated entirely by Hispanics, the average fraction of 
Hispanic population in early-activating counties would not exceed 27 per-
cent. Instead, the nearly 38 percent share of Hispanics in early-activating 
counties can only be explained by the fact that the government targeted 
counties that were not on the southern border but that did have proportion-
ately large Hispanic populations.  These demographic differences suggest that 
Secure Communities may have been directed in part at counties where more 
immigration violators were expected to be found. 
The final two rows of Table 2 contemplate the other possible policy ob-
jective of Secure Communities: crime control. They compare the rates of vio-
lent and property crimes in early- and later-activating counties. Consistent 
with conventional practice in the academic literature, the crime rates are ex-
pressed as natural logarithms of the crime rate scaled up by 100 thousand. 
Crime rates vary widely across jurisdictions, and this convention places less 
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weight on outlying locations with extremely high or low crime rates.65 Early-
activating counties had higher rates of both violent and property crime, and 
the differences are statistically meaningful. The difference suggests that Se-
cure Communities may have been directed in part at counties with more se-
vere crime problems. 
As mentioned above, the hypotheses about the goals of Secure Com-
munities are not mutually exclusive, and Table 2 provides some support for 
both hypotheses about enforcement priorities. But the table also shows that 
the speed of activation correlates more strongly with certain county charac-
teristics than with others, suggesting that one objective of the program had 
higher priority. The differences in crime rates were more modest than those 
in the measures of immigration enforcement. For example, the difference of 
just over one log point for the violent crime rate appears small. When ex-
pressed in levels, the violent crime rate in the first counties to activate is 
double that of later-activating counties. Still, this difference is much smaller 
than the 300 percent difference in the proportion who are noncitizens or the 
500 percent difference in the proportion who are Hispanic. The upshot is 
that the different county characteristics of early activators suggest that both 
general immigration enforcement and crime control priorities shaped Secure 
Communities’ rollout. But the selection of counties appears more consistent 
with the desire to target immigration violators generally—rather than just 
those engaged in serious criminal activity—because early activations targeted 
counties close to the border and counties with a high proportion of nonciti-
zen and Hispanic persons in the population. 
B. Hazard Analysis 
Summary statistics offer some clues about the enforcement priorities of 
Secure Communities, but they do not control for numerous other factors 
that are potentially relevant. To better assess whether the patterns in Table 2 
are robust to other influences, we proceed to multivariate analysis. 
In this Section, we present estimates from survival or hazard models, 
which are particularly well suited to the analysis of the rollout of Secure 
Communities. Hazard models have two important advantages for present 
purposes. First, they allow us to focus directly on how much time passes be-
fore a county is activated under Secure Communities. Waiting time provides 
the best information about the government’s prioritization because the 
length of time until activation measures the temporal sequencing of the pro-
gram’s rollout. Alternative approaches, such as binary measures of whether 

 65 For an explanation of the use of natural logarithms of the crime rate rather than the crime rate 
itself, seeLance Hannon, Peter Knapp, and Robert DeFina, Racial Similarity In the Relationship between 
Poverty and Homicide Rates: Comparing Retransformed Coefficients, 34 Soc Science Rsrch 893, 898–901 
(2005). 
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the program has been activated in a county, are not appropriate because the 
program will eventually operate nationwide. We measure waiting times as 
commencing in October 2008, the first month of Secure Communities’ 
rollout, and ending when the individual county activates. 
The second advantage of hazard analysis is that it produces robust re-
sults even when the event of interest—here activation—has not yet occurred 
for some members of the sample. At the time of our study, 3 percent of 
counties in the United States had not yet activated the program. Even though 
these counties are (right) censored—in that the event of interest has not yet 
occurred for them—hazard analysis permits the outcomes for these counties 
to be related to a set of explanatory variables.66 
In the analysis that follows, the hazard function for a county is the risk 
of the event (activation) occurring at time t, conditional on having survived 
(not activated) until that time.67 The specific hazard models presented here 
are Cox proportional hazard models, which are widely used because they 
avoid bias by not making an arbitrary assumption about the baseline hazard.68 
The relationship of an explanatory variable to the hazard (or risk) of the 
event is more easily interpreted with hazard ratios—that is, the ratio of a risk 
of a particular event relative to the baseline risk—and for that reason, Table 
3 reports hazard ratios. Hazard ratios of greater than one imply that the vari-
able is associated with an increased hazard or shorter waiting time, and a haz-
ard ratio of less than one suggests the variable is associated with a lower haz-
ard or longer waiting time. 
To test our three hypotheses, the hazard models in Table 3 include ex-
planatory variables tracking county demography, proximity to the border, 
crime, and potential political support for Secure Communities.69 The models 
also include fixed effects for each state, though these are not reported in the 
tables in order to conserve space.70 

 66 See S. W. Lagakos, General Right Censoring and Its Impact on the Analysis of Survival, 35 Per-
spectives in Biometry 139, 139 (1979). 
 67 Slightly more formally, the hazard is specified as hi(t, Xi) = ho(t)exp(Xiβ), where Xi are county i’s 
observed characteristics and β is a vector of coefficients. The term exp(Xiβ) shifts the baseline hazard 
function, with a positive coefficient indicating that the explanatory variable increases the hazard. 
 68 See generally D.R. Cox, Regression Models and Life Tables, 34 J Royal Stat Society Series B 
(Methodological) 187 (1972). 
 69 As described above, we follow the convention of expressing crimes rates in natural logarithms. 
For counties with zero values for crime rates, we also followed the convention of replacing the missing 
values for these log crime rates with zeroes and including an indicator variable taking a value one when 
such substitutions were made. We do not report in the tables below the estimates for these indicator vari-
ables. 
 70 The inclusion of fixed effects for states ensures that our results are driven by county-level char-
acteristics rather than state-level characteristics. The inclusion of fixed effects is particularly important in 
light of a fact we documented earlier—that later activations were more likely to be lumpy, state-wide af-
fairs. 
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TABLE 3.  ESTIMATING THE TIME UNTIL ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
County is on Southern 
 Border with Mexico 
4.187** 
(1.006) 
— 
 
4.859** 
(1.480) 
4.191** 
(1.037) 
4.190** 
(1.021) 
4.103** 
(.908) 
County is on the Gulf  of 
 Mexico 
1.581 
(.575) 
 1.619 
(.623) 
1.584 
(.586) 
1.582 
(.574) 
1.587 
(.581) 
Fraction of Population 
 Hispanic 
2.166** 
(.565) 
3.282** 
(1.124) 
— 
 
2.132** 
(.556) 
2.152** 
(.556) 
2.205** 
(.582) 
Fraction of Population 
 Noncitizen 
.937 
(1.205) 
.607 
(.797) 
3.848 
(4.066) 
— 
 
— 1.257 
(1.497) 
Fraction of Population 
 Foreign-Born 
— — 
 
— — .970 
(1.130) 
 
 
Change in Fraction of 
 Population Hispanic 
 2000–2010 
— — — — — .432 
(.758) 
Fraction of Population 
 Black 
.570 
(.268) 
.508 
(.250) 
.529 
(.256) 
.570 
(.268) 
.570 
(.268) 
.584 
(277) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 1.025 
(.024) 
1.201 
(.023) 
1.028 
(.024) 
1.025 
(.024) 
1.025 
(.024) 
1.026 
(.024) 
Log Property Crime Rate 1.013 
(.020) 
1.021 
(.021) 
1.013 
(.020) 
1.013 
(.021) 
1.013 
(.020) 
1.013 
(.020) 
Log Population Density 1.231** 
(.043) 
1.246** 
(.043) 
1.231** 
(.043) 
1.231** 
(.045) 
1.231** 
(.041) 
1.231** 
(.042) 
Log Income per Capita .945 
(.117) 
.936 
(.130) 
.904 
(.111) 
.943 
(.129) 
.945 
(.118) 
.951 
(.115) 
Fraction in Poverty .474 
(.348) 
.603 
(.381) 
.521 
(.348) 
.472 
(.359) 
.473 
(.350) 
.458 
(.354) 
Fraction of Vote in 2004 
for President Republican 
.750 
(.403) 
.746 
(.461) 
.723 
(.401) 
.749 
(.407) 
.749 
(.406) 
.775 
(.378) 
Count of Local Anti-
Immigrant Legislation 
.997 
(.082) 
.987 
(.084) 
.997 
(.082) 
.997 
(.082) 
.997 
(.082) 
.999 
(.084) 
Local 287(g) Agreement 4.164** 
(1.493) 
4.441** 
(1.681) 
4.109** 
(1.458) 
4.159** 
(1.487) 
4.162** 
(1.498) 
4.151** 
(1.498) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. “ N = 3,077. Estimates for 
state fixed effects are not reported in order to conserve space. 
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1. Immigration enforcement. 
The first set of explanatory variables in Table 3 explores the striking 
pattern in the summary statistics—that county demographics and border 
proximity, much more than crime rates, appear to be highly correlated with 
activation. These patterns hinted that the rollout might not have been target-
ed exclusively at crime reduction. As we will see below, the hazard models in 
Table 3 confirm some of these patterns, but undermine others in surprising 
and potentially troubling ways. 
The strongest correlates of activation remain location on the southern 
border and the fraction of the population that is Hispanic. The hazard mod-
els show that a county’s location on the border with Mexico is strongly corre-
lated with a high risk of activation. The estimates imply that counties on the 
southern border have a hazard rate of activation roughly four times higher 
than that of other counties. 
The fraction of Hispanics in the county population also strongly pre-
dicts activation. For example, the estimate in column (1) implies that a ten 
percentage-point increase in the share of Hispanics in a county’s population 
corresponds to a 8.0 percent jump in the hazard for Secure Communities ac-
tivation.71 This result confirms that the pattern seen in the summary statistics 
of Table 2 for the Hispanic share of the population does not diminish when 
we control for other factors that might influence activation. Moreover, to al-
leviate the concern that this correlation is an artifact of some unobserved 
characteristic that correlates with minority population more generally, we 
provide for a sort of placebo test by including in the model a measure of the 
black population. Because this measure of race lacks the salience in contem-
porary debates about immigration enforcement that Hispanic ethnicity car-
ries, one would not expect it to correlate with activation. Consistent with this 
intuition, the estimate for black population is less than one, implying that 
counties with proportionately more black residents were activated later on 
average rather than being prioritized for early activation. In addition, each 
estimate for a county’s black population is statistically insignificant, indicating 
that it unlike Hispanic ethnicity does not have a statistically significant corre-
lation with the timing of activation. 
The correlations for border proximity and Hispanic population are also 
robust. In every specification in Table 3 that includes these variables, the es-
timates are statistically significant and relatively stable in magnitude. Of 
course, these variables correlate strongly with each other; counties along the 
border have proportionately much larger Hispanic populations than the na-
tional average. To gauge how sensitive the estimate for each of these varia-
bles is to the presence of the other, column (2) reports an equation in which 

 71 To see this, note that ln(2.166) = 0.7729, and exp(0.7729*.1) = 1.0804. 
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both indicators for the southern border were dropped, and column (3) re-
ports an estimate in which the variable for Hispanic population was dropped. 
The exclusions add to the magnitude of the remaining variable’s estimate but 
not enormously so: dropping the border variables raise the hazard ratio for 
the Hispanic share of the population from 2.166 to 3.282, while dropping the 
Hispanic variable raises the hazard ratio for the southern border from 4.187 
to 4.859. Moreover, if we reestimate the equation excluding border counties 
from the sample entirely, the estimates are relatively unchanged. The estimat-
ed hazard ratio for the Hispanic share in particular remains statistically signif-
icant and largely unchanged at 2.135 (standard error = 0.665). These esti-
mates show that although these two county characteristics are correlated, 
each plausibly captures a different influence on the risk of activation. 
In the summary statistics above, a county’s noncitizen population was 
also correlated with activation—though more weakly than Hispanic popula-
tion or border proximity. In the hazard models, however, the relationship be-
tween noncitizen population and activation is flipped on its head. The hazard 
ratio for noncitizens is in some models less than one. This means that, rather 
than increasing the likelihood of activation, a larger share of noncitizens in a 
county modestly reduces the likelihood of activation. For example, the haz-
ard ratio of .937 in column (1) implies that a ten percentage-point increase in 
the share of noncitizens in a county’s population lowers the hazard by about 
one percentage point.72 
The direction of this estimate is surprising, even counterintuitive. The 
central function of Secure Communities is to check the status of noncitizens 
through fingerprints, and on one theory this technology would promise the 
greatest benefit where there were the greatest numbers of noncitizens. Yet 
noncitizen population does not predict activation. Moreover, the results for 
noncitizens contrast sharply with the estimates for Hispanic population. If 
taken at face value, they indicate that early activation targeted counties with 
large Hispanic populations but did not target counties with large noncitizen 
populations. 
Of course, a crucial caveat to these estimates is that they reflect the ef-
fect of noncitizens’ population share after controlling for the Hispanic share 
and other county characteristics. As mentioned above, Hispanic ethnicity and 
noncitizen status are highly correlated in these data, and thus, any correlation 
between noncitizens and activation may be captured to a large extent by the 
presence of the Hispanic share variable. The results provide some reason to 
believe this is the case. When the Hispanic share variable is excluded from 
the set of explanatory variables in column (3), the estimate for noncitizens’ 

 72 To see this, note that ln(0.937) = -0.651, and exp(-0.651*0.1) = 0.994.This indicates that a county 
with ashare of noncitizens that is ten percentage points greater than the baseline has a hazard that is 85 
percent that of the baseline. 
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share changes direction, implying that a ten percentage-point increase in the 
proportion of noncitizens in the county raises the risk of activation by 14 
percent.73 For this reason, it would be inappropriate to advance a strong 
claim that Hispanic ethnicity accelerated activation while noncitizen status 
slowed it. 
That said, it is important to note that Hispanics’ share of a county’s 
population appears to be a more powerful predictor of activation than 
noncitizens’ share of the population. Just as any correlation between nonciti-
zens and activation may be captured to a large extent by the presence of the 
Hispanic share variable, the opposite could be said about the noncitizens var-
iable. But while the presence of the Hispanic variable eliminates the correla-
tion between noncitizen population and activation (and in fact suggests an 
inverse correlation), the opposite is not true: the presence of the noncitizens’ 
variable does not impair the correlation between ethnicity and the activation 
hazard. Column (4) shows that when the measure of noncitizens is excluded 
from the equation, the estimated hazard ratio for Hispanics’ share falls only 
modestly from 2.166 to 2.132. Thus, Hispanic population does appear to ex-
ert a greater influence on the estimate for noncitizens than vice versa. 
Perhaps even more important, none of the estimates for noncitizens’ 
share attain statistical significance—not even in column (3) when the Hispan-
ic variable is excluded from the equation and the noncitizen estimate con-
notes a positive relationship with the activation hazard. In contrast, the esti-
mates for Hispanics’ population share are positive and statistically significant 
in every single model. These patterns suggest that the time-until-activation 
correlates more closely with the proportion of Hispanics in a county than 
with the proportion of noncitizens.74 
2. Crime control. 
The second set of variables tests our second hypothesis about the objec-
tives of Secure Communities: its relationship to crime control. If crime con-
trol was a key objective of the program, we would predict that locations with 
higher crime rates should have activated sooner.75 The summary statistics in 
Table 2 provided some evidence for this hypothesis. But the hazard analysis 
undermines this support. Once we control for other influences on activation, 

 73 To see this, note that ln(3.848) = 1.348, and exp(1.348*0.1) = 1.144. 
 74 Replacing noncitizen population with foreign-born population produces the same results. The 
model in column (5) replaces the measure of noncitizens with the fraction of foreign-born persons in the 
population. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the foreign-born and noncitizen variables are highly correlated, and 
the estimates from using one measure are essentially identical to those from using the other. These results 
suggest that the activation hazard correlates with the fraction of Hispanics in a county rather than either 
the fraction noncitizen or the fraction foreign-born. 
 75 See text accompanying notes 35–. 
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local crime rates are not consistently correlated with the decision to activate 
Secure Communities. 
As in the summary statistics, Table 3 includes two principal measures of 
crime rate: the (log) rate of violent crime and the (log) rate of property crime. 
Given Secure Communities’ putative focus on violent crime, we would pre-
dict that the violent crime rate, but perhaps not the property crime rate, 
would be associated with early activation. In fact, however, neither measure 
of crime predicts early activation. The hazard ratios for both violent and 
property crime hover around the baseline risk of one, and none of these es-
timates attain statistical significance.These estimates imply that, contrary to 
our prediction, crime rates are not closely related to the activation hazard—a 
surprising result. In order to explore the apparent irrelevance of crime rates 
in more depth, Table 4 presents a series of additional models that examine 
more closely why crime rates have such a weak relationship to the speed of 
activation. 
	
		

	

 12/12/12
2013] Policing Immigration 133 
 
TABLE 4.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIME AND  
TIME UNTIL ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
County is on Southern  
Border with Mexico 
4.187** 
(1.006) 
4.214** 
(1.010) 
4.126** 
(.939) 
3.813** 
(.949) 
5.341** 
(1.663) 
County is on the  
Gulf of Mexico 
1.581 
(.575) 
1.582 
(.574) 
1.558 
(.551) 
1.511 
(.494) 
1.550 
(.541) 
Fraction of Population  
Hispanic 
2.166** 
(.565) 
2.163** 
(.569) 
2.084** 
(.574) 
2.148** 
(.538) 
2.194** 
(.553) 
Fraction of Population 
Noncitizen 
.937 
(1.205) 
.928 
(1.202) 
.869 
(1.139) 
1.079 
(1.520) 
2.190 
(2.887) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 1.025 
(.024) 
1.033 
(.025) 
— 1.027 
(.024) 
1.060** 
(.028) 
Log Property Crime Rate 1.013 
(.020) 
— .995 
(.018) 
.997 
(.022) 
1.083** 
(.025) 
Log Murder Rate — — .979 
(.034) 
— — 
Log Rape Rate — — 1.025 
(.026) 
— — 
Log Aggravated Assault  Rate — — .995 
(.020) 
— — 
Log Robbery Rate 
 
— — 1.082 
(.032) 
— — 
Log Police Officers  
per  Capita 
— — — 1.013 
(.100) 
— 
Log Population Density 1.231** 
(.043) 
1.232** 
(.043) 
1.202** 
(.045) 
1.257** 
(.058) 
— 
 
Log Income per Capita .945 
(.117) 
.950 
(.118) 
.886 
(.111) 
.925 
(.121) 
1.266 
(.189) 
Fraction in Poverty .474 
(.348) 
.476 
(.351) 
.391 
(.293) 
.489 
(.344) 
.213** 
(.173) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,077, except for col-
umn (2) where N = 2,827. The baseline regression in column (1) is identical to the baseline regression in 
column (1) of Table 3. Estimates for some variables in the baseline model are not reported in order to 
conserve space. 
 
Table 4 explores three potential problems with Table 3’s estimates 
about the relevance of crime rates. The first stems from the close correlation 
between violent crime and property crime. If violent crime is, as agency offi-
cials suggest, the program’s highest priority, then the inclusion of both vio-
lent and property crime in the model might, because of their close correla-
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tion, mask a strong relationship between activation and violent offenses. The 
equation in column (2) excludes the property crime rate from the set of ex-
planatory variables, and the resulting estimates reject this possibility. The ex-
clusion of property crime from the model has virtually no effect on the esti-
mate for violent crime (or any of the other parameter estimates for that 
matter). 
A second possibility is that our estimates are sensitive to the precise 
measures of crime employed. The model in column (3) replaces the total vio-
lent crime rate with those of its constituent subcategories: murder, rape, ag-
gravated assault, and robbery. For three of these offense categories, the esti-
mated hazard ratios for these offense categories are close to one, implying no 
relationship to the activation hazard, and are statistically insignificant. The 
one offense category showing a statistically significant correlation with the 
activation hazard is robbery.  But the magnitude of the estimated relationship 
is small. It implies that a 10% increase in the (log) rate of robbery over the 
sample average raises the hazard by 1.9 percent above the baseline hazard. 
A third concern arises from the potential relationship between crime 
and other controls in the model. For example, it is possible that border prox-
imity and crime are correlated. If so, then perhaps ICE targeted high crime 
areas by targeting the border, such that we should count the correlation be-
tween border proximity and early activation as evidence of a crime-control 
agenda. It is certainly true that agency officials, right up to DHS Secretary Ja-
net Napolitano, said publicly that activation along the southern border would 
be pursued as part of a strategy to disrupt violence related to international 
drug cartels.76 Table 3 already explored this possibility by testing the sensitivi-
ty of the model to the presence of the border location variable. Were that 
variable highly correlated with local crime rates, its presence might mask a 
link between rollout timing and crime. But the estimates in column (2) of 
Table 3 suggest this is not the case. Omitting the border proximity variable 
has a negligible effect on the hazard ratios for the crime variables, and does 
not elevate them to statistical significance. 
Introducing other measures potentially correlated with crime similarly 
has no effect. For example, crime rates and policing tend to move together, 
as jurisdictions with more severe crime problems react by hiring more offic-
ers. But the results in column (4) of Table 4 show that including a measure of 
officers per capita has no effect on the estimated hazard ratio for violent or 
property crime. Moreover, while criminologists have long observed that both 

 76 See DHS, Secretary Napolitano Announces Secure Communities Deployment (cited in note 51). 
At the level of public justification this explanation is complicated by the fact that the prioritization of bor-
der areas was not announced by Secretary Napolitano until a number of months after Secure Communi-
ties’ rollout began. The timing of the Secretary’s statements undercuts the likelihood that the early rollout 
was designed to use border location as a proxy for crime.  
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income levels and population density correlate with crime rates—in part be-
cause crime is more common in cities—their presence is not wholly respon-
sible for the effectively zero estimates for the crime rates.77 As the estimates 
in Table 4 show, income levels are largely unrelated to the likelihood of acti-
vation. Population density does have a consistently positive effect, raising the 
possibility that the estimated relationship between crime and activation is 
sensitive to the inclusion of the control for population density, but column 
(5) shows that excluding the measure of population density has a modest ef-
fect on the estimates for the crime rates.78 When population density is ex-
cluded from the model, the estimated hazard ratios for property and violent 
crime both exceed one and attain statistical significance. But the size of their 
implied effects is smaller than those of the demographic and border varia-
bles. Raising the (log) rate of property crime by 10% above its sample mean 
implies a 5.7 percent increase in the hazard over its baseline. For violent 
crime, the comparable figure is 2.8 percent. In short, Table 4 suggests that 
the basic findings in Table 3 are not sensitive to our choice about how to 
measure crime rates or to the inclusion or exclusion of other variables that 
are correlated with crime. 
Of course, as Part II’s discussion of potential hypotheses makes clear, 
simply targeting high crime rate communities is not the only way that immi-
gration agencies might have used Secure Communities to target crime reduc-
tion and the removal of “criminal aliens.” Using crime rates to set rollout 
strategy is one plausible strategy. But the agency might have preferred in an 
ideal world to prioritize rollout in areas that have both high crime rates and 
large numbers of noncitizens. If that was in fact the strategy, then the models 
in Table 3 risk understating the significance of crime rates for rollout timing. 
To test this possibility directly, Table 5 adds to the baseline model from Ta-
ble 3 terms that interact both the Hispanic and noncitizen population with 
crime rates. 

 77 See, for example, Ronald W. Beasley and George Antunes, The Etiology of Urban Crime: An 
Ecological Analysis, 11 Criminology 439, 448 (1974) (showing that population density is a strong, positive 
correlate of crime rates). 
 78 Although not shown in Table 3, removing per capita income and the poverty rate from the mod-
el has a similar effect on the estimates for the crime rates. 
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TABLE 5.  MIXED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY AND TIME UNTIL 
ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fraction of Population  
Hispanic 
1.854** 
(.709) 
1.854** 
(.709) 
2.182** 
(.554) 
2.111** 
(.544) 
2.210** 
(.605) 
Fraction of Population  
Noncitizen 
.541 
(.715) 
.541 
(.715) 
.188 
(.231) 
.042** 
(.060) 
.909 
(1.194) 
Fraction of Population  Black .572 
(.272) 
.572 
(.272) 
.537 
(.257) 
.536 
(.258) 
.517 
(.276) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 1.009 
(.006) 
1.008 
(.022) 
1.006 
(.024) 
1.000 
(.023) 
1.012 
(.024) 
Log Violent Crime Rate x 
Second Quartile of Demographic 
1.015* 
(.009) 
1.009 
(.006) 
1.005 
(.007) 
1.007 
(.006) 
1.003 
(.011) 
Log Violent Crime Rate x 
Third Quartile of Demographic 
1.032** 
(.015) 
1.015* 
(.009) 
1.013 
(.011) 
1.018* 
(.010) 
1.017 
(.012) 
Log Violent Crime Rate x 
Fourth Quartile of Demographic  
1.039 
(.030) 
— 1.049** 
(.015) 
 1.016 
(.018) 
Log Violent Crime Rate x 
75th – 90th of Demographic 
— 1.032** 
(.015) 
 
 
1.054** 
(015) 
 
Log Violent Crime Rate x 
Top Decile of Demographic 
— 1.039 
(.030) 
— 1.093** 
(.038) 
 
Demographic Interacted: 
Fraction of Population . . .  
Hispanic Hispanic Noncitizen Noncitizen Black 
*p<0.10, **p<0.10 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. “ N = 3,077. Except for the 
two interaction terms, the baseline regression in column (1) is identical to the baseline regression in col-
umn (1) of Table 3. Estimates for all other variables are not reported in order to conserve space. 
 
 The models in Table 5 interact the violent crime rate with a series of 
indicator variables that identify where in the distribution of a particular de-
mographic measure a county falls.  For example, the model in column (1) in-
teracts the violent crime rate with indicators for whether a county falls within 
one of the top three quartiles of the fraction of population that is Hispanic.  
Adding these interaction terms allows us to test the hypothesis that ICE pri-
oritized counties that had both very high crime rates and very large nonciti-
zen populations—a sort of skimming off the cream theory of rollout.  If ICE 
pursued such a strategy, the hazard ratios on the interaction terms should 
grow as we move up the demographic quartiles.  In theory, the hazard ratio 
should be largest for the interaction term that reflects the highest concentra-
tion of the relevant demographic—here the interaction terms that reflect the 
top decile of the relevant characteristic. 
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The model in column (1) offers weak support for this hypothesis.  The 
hazard ratios on the interactions terms are all slightly greater than one, and 
they are larger in counties with proportionately larger Hispanic populations.  
For example, the hazard ratio on the interaction of violent crime with the se-
cond quartile of Hispanic population is 1.015, and for top quartile, it is 1.039.  
By contrast, the main effect of the violent crime rate has a hazard ratio that is 
almost exactly one, implying that aside from the interaction terms, varying 
the rate of violent crime has no impact on the hazard for activation.  Taken 
at face value, the estimates suggest that a higher violent crime rate slightly ac-
celerated the activation time in counties with a relatively large Hispanic popu-
lation and had almost no impact on the time-until-activation in other coun-
ties.   Raising the (log) rate of violent crime by 10% over the sample mean 
implies a less than one percentage point increase over the baseline hazard 
rate for a county with a Hispanic population in the lowest quartile, but it im-
plies a 1.8 percent increase over the baseline hazard rate for a county with a 
Hispanic population in the highest quartile.  The model in column (2) pro-
vides a further test by looking at counties with the very highest share of His-
panic population—counties in the top decile.  Its pattern is similar to that 
seen in column (1).   
Columns (3) and (4) present estimates of analogous interactions for the 
fraction of the population that is noncitizen, and here, the patterns are 
somewhat more pronounced.  The effect of a higher crime rate on the activa-
tion hazard is larger when noncitizens comprise a larger fraction of a coun-
ty’s population.  Again, the violent crime rate has almost no effect on the ac-
tivation hazard in counties with few noncitizens.  But as the share of 
noncitizens in a county grows, the impact of the violent crime rate on the 
speed of activation rises monotonically.  The model in column (4) implies 
that raising the (log) rate of violent crime by 10% over the sample mean in a 
county with a noncitizen population in the top decile raises the activation 
hazard by 4.3 percent over the baseline hazard rate.  Unlike the earlier inter-
actions with the Hispanic population, the interaction terms with the nonciti-
zen population are statistically significant.  These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that ICE prioritized for activation counties with higher rates 
of violent crime and proportionately larger noncitizen populations. 
The final column of Table 5 presents a type of placebo test.  It includes 
interactions of the violent crime rate with measures of fraction of a county’s 
residents who are black.  As noted above, we would not expect the size of a 
county’s black population to relate to the speed of activation.  The estimates 
in column (5) confirm this prediction.  The interactions do not correlate with 
strongly with the timing of activation, and their presence has no effect on the 
estimates for the other variables.  The absence of a correlation for these ra-
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cial variables should give some confidence that the patterns for ethnicity and 
citizenship status are not spurious.   
The results in Table 5 lend support to the view that ICE assigned higher 
priority for activation to counties with both proportionately more nonciti-
zens and higher violent crime rates. While crime rates themselves do not ap-
pear to predict rollout, crime does matter in those areas that have large 
noncitizen populations. 
That said, it is important to note that controlling for these interactions 
does not undermine estimated effect of other influences we identified earlier. 
Even in the models in Table 5, the fraction of the county population that is 
Hispanic and the proximity to the southern border remain strongly related to 
the speed of activation.  In fact, they remain the strongest predictors: the im-
plied magnitude of these influences is much larger than the interaction of 
violent crime and the size of the noncitizen population.  Thus, the possibility 
that ICE prioritized counties with proportionately more noncitizens and 
higher violent crime rates can explain only a part of the observed pattern of 
activation.  The most powerful explanations remain the two identified earlier: 
the county’s Hispanic population fraction and its proximity to the border.  
3. The politics of rollout. 
The final explanatory variables in Table 3 investigate our third hypothe-
sis about the activation of Secure Communities—that the degree of local po-
litical support is a crucial predictor of early activation. The large literature on 
cooperative federalism suggests that such support may be relevant. The diffi-
culty, of course, is that it is hard to gauge directly which local communities 
favor increased immigration enforcement of this sort and which oppose it. 
We therefore test several potential measures. 
The first rough measure of local attitudes is the vote share the Republi-
can presidential candidate received in the 2004 election. At least in recent 
years, support for the Republican Party (and ideological conservatism more 
generally) is significantly correlated with opposition to immigration and sup-
port for increased immigration enforcement.79 Nonetheless, Table 3 shows 
that local support for Republicans does not correlate meaningfully with acti-
vation. The estimates for Republican vote share are statistically insignificant 

 79 See, for example, Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Importance of 
the Political in Immigration Federalism *4 (forthcoming 2012), online at 
http://www.karthick.com/workingpapers_assets/GR-submission-2-23.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012) (noting 
that the partisan composition of a location is correlated with immigration regulation and that Republican 
areas are more likely to have strong immigration laws); Pew Research Center, Trends in American Values: 
1987–2012; Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years 11–12, 20 (Pew Research Center June 4, 
2012), online at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf (visit-
ed Oct 27, 2012) (showing the wide difference of values related to immigration between supporters of 
President Barak Obama and those of Mitt Romney). 
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in every regression. Moreover, if the point estimates were taken at face value, 
they would imply an effect opposite of the one anticipated, as the hazard ra-
tio is less than one in every specification. 
A potentially more precise measure of local sentiment is a count of the 
number of anti-immigrant laws enacted locally. Rather than forcing us to rely 
on partisanship in the presidential election as a proxy, this measure permits 
us to observe directly the actions taken by local politicians that relate to im-
migrants and immigration enforcement. The tally of local anti-immigrant leg-
islation was generously provided by Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, 
who collected the information as part of a project to create an index captur-
ing each state’s climate for immigrants.80 The more precise measure of atti-
tudes on immigration provided by local legislation also fails to correlate with 
activation. The hazard ratios are statistically insignificant in every specifica-
tion and are very close to one in all instances. Perhaps surprisingly, the pres-
ence of local anti-immigrant legislation does not have a meaningful influence 
on the timing of a county’s activation. 
Nor do other potential measures of local sentiment.81 Recent work by 
political scientists suggests that communities in which the Hispanic popula-
tion has grown most rapidly might be those in which a political backlash and 
calls for stricter immigration enforcement are more likely to occur.82 The 

 80 Pham and Pham, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants (cited in note 63).  The paper by Pham 
and Pham includes counts of both pro- and anti-immigrant legislation at the county level.  We excluded 
the small number of local laws categorized as pro-immigrant.  In addition, while their paper also includes 
state-level legislation, that legislation is coextensive with our state fixed effects and was therefore omitted.  
 81 In addition to political sentiment, we also attempted to test for local financial incentives. Some 
critics of Secure Communities have argued that local governments with excess jail capacity will have an 
incentive to participate in order to get paid for housing immigrant detainees identified by the program.See, 
for example, Chris Kirkham, Private Prisons Profit from Immigration Crackdown, Federal and Local Law 
Enforcement Partnerships, Huffington Post (June 7, 2012), online at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-federal-law-
enforcement_n_1569219.html (visited Oct 27, 2012); Jessica M. Vaughan and Russ Doubleday, Subsidiz-
ing Sanctuaries: The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program 1 (Center for Immigration Studies Nov 
2010), online at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/subsidizing-sanctuaries.pdf (visited Oct 27, 
2012).While this potential financial payoff for participating is hard to calculate—and many counties have 
complained that federal reimbursements for detention do not cover their costs—we examined the pattern 
of activations for the fifty counties with the largest prison systems. Within that set, counties with prisons 
operating below capacity activated a statistically insignificant twenty-six days earlier than counties with 
prisons operating at or above capacity. Nineteen counties with capacity exceeding 100 percent activated in 
an average of 565.2 days, while 31 counties with less than 100 percent capacity activated in an average of 
539.0 days. Running our basic hazard model using these fifty counties (and leaving out state fixed effects) 
yields a hazard ratio of 1.00 (standard error = .00859) for the percentage of prison capacity, which is also 
consistent with the presence of excess bed space having no effect on rollout. 
 82 See Martin Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweimüller, Does Immigration into Their 
Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria *1–
3, 27 (University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No 83, July 1, 2012), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103623 (visited Oct 27, 2012) (finding that Austri-
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equation in column (6) of Table 3 tests this hypothesis by including a variable 
for the change in Hispanics’ share of the population over the past decade. 
The estimated hazard ratio for this variable is statistically insignificant and, 
like the Republican vote share, is less than one, contrary to the backlash hy-
pothesis. Also, the inclusion of the growth measure has little effect on the 
estimates for the other variables. 
The only potential measure of local support that does correlate with ac-
tivation is whether a local government has a 287(g) cooperative enforcement 
agreement with the federal government. The presence of a 287(g) agreement 
in a county corresponds to an estimated increase in the activation hazard of 
roughly four times over the baseline hazard. That said, the relationship be-
tween 287(g) agreements and activation is far from clear evidence of a con-
nection between activation and local political support. The willingness of lo-
cal law enforcement to enter into such an agreement may reflect local 
political support for increased immigration enforcement—support that in 
turn influenced activation. Alternatively, the connection between 287(g) 
agreements and activation may simply reflect operational efficiency. Local 
police participating in the 287(g) program already have an established rela-
tionship with federal officials, and the existence of this relationship may facil-
itate an early activation of Secure Communities. 
Regardless of the political variable employed, therefore, the estimates 
for these variables provide little support for the hypothesis that local political 
support or opposition was a factor in activation. There are, of course, other 
minor wrinkles. Some might argue, for example, that the border proximity 
variable should be interpreted as a political variable, as proximity to the bor-
der might correlate with increased local support for immigration enforce-
ment. Certainly there are high-profile instances of border state politicians 
complaining loudly about the failure of federal immigration enforcement. On 
balance, however, the basic patterns in the hazard models do not provide 
much support for the hypothesis that political support was a crucial factor in 
Secure Communities’ rollout. 
IV.  DISCRETION, PREDICTION, AND THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
Immigration enforcement has long been criticized as ad hoc and arbi-
trary, with the possibility of punishment for violating the immigration code 
turning more on happenstance or the caprice of low-level bureaucrats rather 

an communities with a higher proportion of low- and medium-skilled immigrants were more likely to sup-
port the nationalist Freedom Party of Austria). 
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than anything else.83 The principle that “like cases must be treated alike,” of-
ten taken as central to the very idea of justice,84 has seemed to many to be 
honored only in the breach when it comes to immigration law. 
Whatever the historical accuracy of claims about the disorganization of 
immigration enforcement, it is clear that today there is an ongoing project to 
systematize and centralize the exercise of discretion within the immigration 
bureaucracy. Perhaps the most prominent example of this trend is President 
Obama’s announcement that his administration will not seek to deport many 
young people who came to the United States without authorization as chil-
dren.85 But this recent development is far from an election-year outlier. In-
stead, it is but a piece of a much broader effort to regulate the use of prose-
cutorial discretion within the agencies that administer immigration policy.86 
Moreover, these efforts have deep roots in a central structural feature of 
modern immigration law. Modern immigration law effectively renders huge 
numbers of noncitizens presumptively deportable—a structural feature that 
delegates tremendous policy-making authority to the executive.87 
The rollout of Secure Communities is both further evidence of the 
power of the president over immigration policy and an additional means of 
centralizing the use of discretion within the executive branch.88 Before Secure 
Communities, people arrested by local police were screened for immigration 
violations in only a small number of communities around the country.89 Soon 
such screening will be universal. Local officials will have no power to pick 
and choose directly which arrestees get screened (though, of course, they do 
have the power to decide whom to arrest). And for those arrestees who are 
identified as potentially deportable, the consolidation of the screening func-

 83 For a few recent versions of this decades-long critique, see, for example, Daniel Kanstroom, 
Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (2007); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Im-
migration Law, 84 Colum L Rev 1, 69 (1984). 
 84 David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? *18–19 (Chicago Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper No 24, May 8, 2002), online at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/24.strauss.like-cases.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012); H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law 155 (Clarendon 1961). 
 85 See Preston and Cushman, Obama to Permit Young Migrants, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 
39) (describing President Obama’s announcement that the US government will not institute removal pro-
ceedings again certain immigrants who entered the United States at a young age, including those with high 
school degrees or past military service). 
 86 See Morton, Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion at 4 (cited in note 38) (setting 
out, in a memorandum to ICE personnel, a list of factors to consider when deciding whether to prosecute 
immigration-related offenses). 
 87 See Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L J 
458, 463 (2009) (noting that roughly one-third of all noncitizens living in the United States are deportable 
at the option of the executive, giving the president broad de facto authority to set immigration policy). 
 88 See DHS, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks (cited in note 35)(contrasting Secure Communities 
with earlier ad hoc approaches). 
 89 See text accompanying notes 2–13. 
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tion facilitates the more uniform exercise of discretion. If DHS chooses, it 
can more frequently ensure that like cases are treated alike.90 
These changes in immigration enforcement parallel important trends in 
modern criminal law. In both prosecutors’ offices and law enforcement 
agencies, efforts are underway in many places to discipline the vast discretion 
historically held by the individual prosecutor and the lone cop on the beat. 
Prominent prosecutors’ offices have begun adopting internal controls de-
signed to promote the more uniform administration of justice.91 Major police 
forces have increasingly come to rely on data-driven models of crime preven-
tion and officer accountability.92 DHS, which houses both the prosecuting 
arm and police force for immigration law, has drawn on both of these devel-
opments in structuring Secure Communities. 
In all of these contexts, the benefits of centralizing discretion often 
come with hidden costs. As Bernard Harcourt  and others have noted in the 
criminal context, for example, these more “rational”models of policing can 
often obscure the ways in which seemingly neutral rules can in practice con-
centrate the burdens of law enforcement on minority communities.93 Our 
findings about Secure Communities suggest that this may be precisely what 
happened during the program’s rollout. Early activation under the program is 
highly correlated with the size of a county’s Hispanic population—a possibil-
ity that has been obscured by both the official justifications for Secure 
Communities and the less-than-transparent“risk-based” model that DHS has 
said it used to set activation priorities.94 
The tight correlation under Secure Communities between activation and 
ethnicity is obviously troubling. Nor can it be dismissed as an artifact of the 
government’s focus on the border or on areas containing large pockets of 

 90 We are exploring whether there is evidence that the agency is actually doing just this as part of 
our larger empirical assessment of Secure Communities.SeeAdam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, The Fu-
ture of Immigration Federalism (on file with authors). 
 91 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Ad-
ministrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 915–21 (2009)(describing the use of internal review and structural 
separation in various US Attorney’s offices to limit discretion and improve accountability); Center on the 
Administration of Criminal Law, Establishing Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’ Offices: A 
Report of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law’s Conviction Integrity Project 4–5 (NYU 
School of Law 2012), online at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__centers__center_on_administra
tion_of_criminal_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_073583.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2012)(proposing 
various reforms in prosecutors’ offices aimed at reducing the risk of wrongful convictions). 
 92 The rise in the role of prediction and systematization in law enforcement has been documented 
by Professor Bernard Harcourt, who has given it the (slightly pejorative) label “actuarial justice.”Bernard 
E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 2–3 (Chicago 
2007). The trend has even penetrated deeply into pop culture, with thecult crime show The Wire revolving 
centrally around CompSTAT—a real-world data-analysis tool designed to help police departments allocate 
resources efficiently and centralize discretion within their organizations.  
 93 See Harcourt, Against Prediction at 4–6 (cited in note 92). 
 94 See note 45 and accompanying text. 
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noncitizens. Instead, as the detailed analysis in Part III demonstrated, the 
correlation between activation and Hispanic population is extremely persis-
tent: it remains large and statistically significant even when we control for 
border proximity and myriad other factors on which the government might 
have relied in deciding where to target its limited enforcement resources. 
To be sure, our findings do not necessarily mean that those designing 
the rollout strategy engaged in racial profiling. In the parlance of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, the data reveal a disparate impact, but cannot identify 
disparate treatment—the intentional singling out of a racial or ethnic group. 
Still, one can imagine that some might defend the resulting pattern on the 
ground that, regardless of the government’s motive, singling out predomi-
nantly Hispanic communities for increased immigration enforcement is “ra-
tional” because the number of immigration violators in a community is cor-
related with the size of the Hispanic population. A number of commentators 
have argued in other contexts that racial profiling is perfectly rational and 
should be lawful—so long as the government relies on accurate statistical 
generalizations about the profiled group.95 And many years ago the Supreme 
Court suggested that Hispanic ethnicity could in fact be used by law en-
forcement officers as a factor in determining whether there is reasonable 
suspicion that a person has violated immigration law.96 
Figuring out whether targeting Hispanic communities in the rollout is 
consistent with “rational”profiling, understood in the above sense, is well be-
yond the scope of this paper. We should note, however, that the data in our 
larger empirical study of Secure Communities cast some doubt on such a 
claim.97 For while the rollout itself correlates highly with the fraction of a 
county’s population that is Hispanic, the fraction of that county’s submis-
sions that yield matches against ICE’s biometric database does not.98 In other 
words, “hit rates” under the program do not appear to correlate meaningfully 
with a county’s Hispanic population. Yet if the proportion of a county that 
was Hispanic were truly correlated with the proportion of the county that 

 95 See, for example, Heather Mac Donald, Are Cops Racist? How the War against the Police Harms 
Black Americans 9–10, 28–29 (Ivan R. Dee 2003)(arguing that racial profiling may be an effective law en-
forcement tool when based on correct statistical assumptions); Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, 
and Stereotypes 18–19 (Belknap 2006) (distinguishing between statistically sound and unsound generaliza-
tions about people). 
 96 See United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 884–87 (1975) (holding that apparent ethnicity 
could be one factor, but not the sole factor, in a stop); cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 192 F.3d 
946 (1999) (holding that Hispanic ethnicity could no longer be a factor in the reasonable suspicion calcu-
lus because of post-Brignoni-Ponce changes to the demography of border areas). 
 97 As we noted earlier, our dataset includes comprehensive statistics on the productivity of Secure 
Communities in each community where it was activated—including the number of monthly submissions, 
hits, arrests by ICE agents, and, ultimately, deportations. See Part III. 
 98 See Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, The Future of Immigration Federalism (on file with au-
thors). 
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was in violation of immigration law, then all else equal one would expect hit 
rates to correlate with ethnicity. 
Ultimately, our aim is not to resolve fully the concerns raised by the pat-
tern of Secure Communities’ rollout. Instead our principal goal has been de-
scriptive—to provide the first large-scale empirical study of the way in which 
discretion has been wielded in the most important immigration enforcement 
initiative adopted in recent history. Our findings have important implications 
for Secure Communities itself, raising questions about the program’s putative 
focus on crime and revealing a troubling correlation between ethnicity and 
the program’s deployment. More broadly, our findings highlight important 
similarities between the structure of modern criminal and immigration en-
forcement, findings that we hope will spur the integration of scholarship on 
both subjects. 
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APPENDIX  
  TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS OF MAIN VARIABLES  
 
Variable Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
County is on Southern Border with Mexico .009 
(.097) 
County is on Gulf of Mexico .018 
(.133) 
Percent Population Hispanic .076 
(.127) 
Change in Percent Population Hispanic  2000–2010 .022 
(.024) 
Percent Population Noncitizen .027 
(.036) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 4.747 
(1.761) 
Log Property Crime Rate 6.994 
(1.987) 
Log Population Density 3.748 
(1.678) 
Log Income per Capita 10.290 
(.229) 
Poverty Rate 15.099 
(6.222) 
Percent of Vote in 2004 for President  
 Republican 
.603 
(.126) 
Percent Population Black .090 
(.143) 
Count of Local Anti-Immigrant  
 Legislation 
.040 
(.314) 
Local 287(g) Agreement .015 
(.121) 
Log Police Officers per Capita 2.058 
(.646) 
 
Note: N = 3,077, except for police per capita where N = 2,827. Means and standard deviations in paren-
theses. 
